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ABSTRACT
Firms undertake a variety of actions to reduce risk through diversification, including entering
diverse lines of business, taking on project partners, and maintaining portfolios of risky projects
such as R&D or natural resource exploration.  By a well-known argument, securities holders do
not directly benefit from risk-reducing corporate diversification when they can replicate this
diversification on their own.  Moreover, shareholders should be risk neutral with respect to the
unsystematic risk that is associated with many research projects.  Some have argued that
corporate risk reduction may be of value, or can otherwise be explained by, the agency
relationship between securities holders and managers. We argue that the value of diversification
strategies in an agency relationship derives not from its effects on risk, but rather from its effects
on the principal's information about the agent's actions.  We demonstrate by example that
diversification activities may increase or decrease the principal's information, depending on the
particular structure of the activity.
Keywords:  diversification; principal-agent relationship
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A frequently stated motive for joint ventures, conglomerate mergers, and investments in 
new lines of business is a desire to diversify the firm and reduce the riskiness of its returns.  
According to this view, joint ventures spread the risk of major projects, while conglomerate 
diversification creates portfolio benefits by pooling uncorrelated returns.  A similar logic may 
drive a corporate decision to pursue simultaneously a variety of different R&D strategies aimed 
at a common goal.
1  A standard argument, however, suggests that with perfect capital markets 
there is no financial value to within-firm diversification because investors could instead diversify 
their own portfolios (Alberts [1966] and Levy and Sarnat [1970]).  Indeed, it may be worse to 
have the firms themselves diversify because this reduces the number of pure securities that are 
traded.
2 
Why, then, do firms undertake activities to diversify risk?  Many analysts have suggested 
diversification is the result of the agency relationship that exists between managers and outside 
investors.
3  The building blocks for an agency-based explanation of diversification are these:  
Risk-averse owners are motivated to hold diversified portfolios and thus (to a first-order 
approximation) behave in a risk-neutral fashion with respect to the firm's investment decisions.
4  
Risk-averse managers would also like to diversify away the risks associated with their firms, but 
                                                 
1   Of course, the firm also could be driven to pursue a variety of positive net present value projects 
where the extensive margin is greater than the intensive margin. 
2   Porter [1987] also makes this point from the perspective of corporate strategy.  In recent years, 
several firms have unbundled their securities, either by outright divestiture of operations or by 
creating separate classes of tracking stocks, each of whose returns are tied to the performance of 
a specific division within the firm.   
3   We briefly discuss alternative explanations in the concluding section. 
4   We do not explore the possibility that the firm is controlled by a "large shareholder" who is 
undiversified.  See Zhang [1998] for an analysis of investment choice in the presence of such an 
owner.    2 
to ensure that a manager has incentives to serve the owners' interests, her current income stream 
may be tied in an undiversified way to the performance of the firm that employs her.  Moreover, 
through the effects on her reputation, a manager's future income may depend on the returns of the 
one firm that she currently manages.  Lacking the opportunity to diversify in other ways (e.g., 
part-time managerial positions with multiple firms), managers may value within-firm 
diversification.  Intuitively, even diversified shareholders benefit from a reduction in the riskiness 
of the firm's profit stream when the reduction lowers the compensation level needed to attract 
and retain (risk-averse) managers, or reduces the distortions in managers' investment decisions. 
In analyzing the effects of agency on diversification incentives, however, it is essential to 
recognize that the relationship between the riskiness of a firm's returns and its manager's well-
being is largely endogenous: The relationship is driven by firm’s choice of managerial 
compensation scheme.
5 As is well known, a risk-neutral principal has incentives to insure a risk-
averse agent, but in the presence of a moral hazard the principal must trade off the provision of 
insurance against the provision of incentives.  As is also well known, the terms of this trade-off 
depend on the degree to which the principal is informed about the agent's actions.
6  One of our 
central concerns in the present paper is whether riskiness matters as well. 
Several earlier authors have (indirectly) addressed the issues of how diversification 
affects information and riskiness, and whether riskiness matters.  Diamond and Verrecchia 
[1982] present a model in which they fully characterize the optimal managerial compensation 
scheme and examine the effects of risk reduction on shareholder welfare.  They interpret their 
results as showing that risk reduction benefits shareholders by reducing agency costs.  
                                                 
5   Indeed, with limited liability, golden parachutes, and stock options, management compensation 
schemes may be convex functions of firm performance and, thus, induce risk loving. 
6   See Holmstrom [1979] and Shavell [1979].    3 
Unfortunately, the parameter in their model that measures riskiness also measures the 
informativeness of the firm's returns as a signal of the agent's effort.  We will argue that changes 
in informativeness, not risk, are what drive Diamond and Verrecchia's findings. 
 Marshall  et al. [1984] argue that diversification can ameliorate agency problems by 
improving the informativeness of the firm's returns as a signal of the agent's effort and by 
reducing the risk borne by the agent for any given contract.  Marshall et al., however, 
characterize informativeness in an informal and, to some extent, inaccurate manner.  Moreover, 
their discussion of risk reduction is incomplete and potentially misleading in that it fails to 
account for changes in the optimal compensation scheme in response to changes in risk. 
  Aron [1988] also argues that diversification is valuable because of the potential benefits 
of improved information that reduces the cost of agency contracting.  She examines a specific 
model in which diversification into additional lines of business generates new signals whose 
noise is independent of the other signals' and which has no effect on the distribution of the other 
signals.  For this independent-returns case, she shows that diversification reduces the cost 
incurred by the principal to induce the agent to undertake effort.  Aron does not formalize the 
concept of increased informativeness, however.  Indeed, in her comparison of diversification and 
the use of relative performance schemes, she focuses her answer on the correlation of returns 
across projects which is not directly related to informativeness.
7 
The effects of corporate diversification on the agency relationship are an example of a 
more general problem. Changes in the structure of the corporation or the agent’s tasks more 
generally can change the statistical relationship between the agent’s ability and effort and the 
                                                 
7   As Holmstrom [1979] has shown, informativeness is related to statistical sufficiency, which is 
different than correlation.  Consider, for example, two random variables s1 and s2.  As long as 
there exists a function, t(·), such that t(s1) = s2, s1 is a sufficient statistic for s2 regardless of their    4 
resulting returns.
8  Financial instruments, such as insurance contracts and foreign exchange 
options, similarly change the relationship between the firm’s returns and the management’s 
characteristics and actions.  When executive compensation contracts depend on measures of firm 
performance, such as the level of sales or profits, the value of the measure is of interest not only 
as a signal of the agent’s effort or ability, but also because it represents the financial returns to 
ownership.  In evaluating corporate investments, the owners of the firm may care about: (1) the 
expected level of returns; (2) the riskiness of the returns; and (3) the informativeness of the 
returns as a signal of managerial effort or ability. 
An important question is how to disentangle these different effects.  It is well known that 
a firm may be willing to trade off expected returns for improved information.  A more difficult 
question is how a firm is willing to trade improvements in informativeness against increases in 
risk, or whether risk even matters.
9  We examine the effects of diversification in a model of 
optimal agency contracting that is general enough to distinguish between changes in riskiness and 
changes in informativeness.  The next section presents a standard agency model in which we 
show that using the conventional Blackwell conception of informativeness, an improvement in 
information (holding the mean return constant) implies a reduction in risk.  Thus, this approach is 
not well suited to examining these issues.  Moreover, we join Gjesdal [1981] and Kim [1995] in 
                                                                                                                                                             
correlation. 
8   See Mirrlees [1976] for an early and insightful analysis of the relationship between agency and 
firm structure. 
9   In a model of hidden information, rather than the hidden-action case examined in the present 
paper, Hermalin [1993] shows that a manager whose future income is tied to the labor market's 
posterior estimate of her abilities could rationally prefer that her firm's returns be as risky as 
possible in order to reduce the informativeness of these returns as signals of her underlying 
ability.  The risk to the manager's reputation is diminished, even though the riskiness of the 
firm’s returns is increased. DeMarzo and Duffie [1995] examine a similar model and find that 
certain risk-reducing actions may reduce informativeness, to the manager’s advantage.    5 
arguing that Blackwell’s definition of informativeness is unduly restrictive for agency purposes.  
We develop alternative measures of informativeness to demonstrate that, when these concepts do 
not coincide, information—not risk—is what matters in the agency setting.  We demonstrate 
through examples that shareholders may prefer a returns structure that entails a high degree of 
risk, but is highly informative, to one that is low-risk, but uninformative. 
In Section 3, we examine the effects of corporate diversification on informativeness. 
While in Aron's model diversification always improves the information structure and the costs of 
diversification derive entirely from the effects of reassigning capital, we allow for the possibility 
that spreading effort itself affects the pattern of returns.  In contrast to Aron, we argue that there 
are plausible cases in which diversification or risk-spreading activities actually reduce 
informativeness.  We also examine the use of hedging and insurance contracts and suggest that 
agency does not provide a good explanation of the use of these contracts. 
In Section 4, we examine what happens when the diversification choice is not verifiable 
in court and thus the managerial compensation scheme cannot be made dependent on it.  While 
in many situations (e.g., mergers and acquisitions) the reasonable assumption is that the 
information structure is verifiable, there are diversification decisions (e.g., the number of paths to 
pursue in new product development or marketing) that the manager makes with little direct 
oversight. While in principle the principal might be able to obtain such information and verify it 
in court, it strikes us as very unlikely that shareholders have anything like this level of detailed 
knowledge in practice.
10  Moreover, even in the case of an acquisition, shareholders may delegate 
                                                 
10   There is a sizable—and inconclusive—empirical literature that examines whether managers 
pursue acquisitions, conglomerate and otherwise, at shareholders' expense.  For example, 
Amihud and Lev [1981], Amihud et al. [1986], and Lewellen et al. [1989] focus on risk-
reduction motives, while Morck et al. [1990] and the references cited therein consider 
acquisitions driven by managerial interests more generally.    6 
the decision to the agent because they lack the information needed to discern whether the 
transaction valuable to the firm when evaluated solely in terms of its expected payoff.  Thus, it is 
worth investigating what happens when the manager controls the diversification decision after 
the principal has set the compensation scheme.
11  We derive conditions under which the lack of 
verifiability does not affect the principal because the agent will choose the principal’s preferred 
information structure.  We show by example, however, that there are other cases in which the 
lack of verifiability with respect to the agent’s diversification decision is costly to the principal. 
2.  THE VALUE OF INFORMATION AND RISK REDUCTION IN AN AGENCY 
MODEL 
A. The  Model 
  Consider a standard principal-agent model similar to Grossman and Hart's [1983].  A 
risk-neutral owner hire a risk-averse manager by offering her an incentive contract on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis.  The manager accepts if her expected utility under the contract is at least as 
great as her reservation utility, which we normalize to zero.  The manager's utility is V(y) - K(a), 
where y is her monetary compensation and a is her action chosen from the finite set A.  K(⋅ ), the 
disutility-of-action function, is increasing; V(⋅ ), the utility of money function, is strictly 
increasing, strictly concave, and has an unbounded range.  The owner’s utility is x - y, where x is 
total revenue generated. 
 A  returns structure is a set of densities over revenue levels, denoted by ΠΠΠΠ
i, where i 
indexes different returns structures.  The vector x ≡  (x1, x2,… , xN)′  represents the set of possible 
                                                 
11    We do not examine the (to us) less plausible case where the structure is not verifiable and is 
controlled by the principal.    7 
revenue levels.
12  Returns are indexed so that m < n implies xm < xn.  An element of ΠΠΠΠ
i is () π n
i a , 
the probability that revenues are xn under the ith returns structure conditional on action a having 




i aa a () () , , (). =
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1   For convenience, we define the index set N ≡  {1, 2,… , N}. 
  As is well known, the returns in this agency problem play two roles.  First, they are the 
source of income for the principal and agent.  In this capacity, we are interested in the riskiness 
of the returns, and second-degree stochastic dominance is the standard measure of riskiness.  For 
the discrete setting under examination here, ππππ
2(a) is riskier than ππππ
1(a) if and only if 










 ∈ ∀ ≤ π π  (1) 
and 
  ππππ
2(a)′ x = ππππ
1(a)′ x. 
Second, the level of returns can serve as a signal to the principal of the action taken by the agent. 
In this role, we are interested in the informativeness of the returns. 
B.  Blackwell Informativeness and Risk in Agency Settings 
The notion of Blackwell informativeness provides a starting point for our analysis.  This 
is the notion that, given the choice between two observation strategies—observe the outcome of 
an experiment or observe the outcome with noise—a rational experimenter would prefer the 
former to the latter.  Hence, if one information structure is a noisy transformation of a second, 
then the second is more informative in a Blackwell sense. 
Consider two standard agency problems that are identical except for the stochastic 
                                                 
12   The prime (′ ) denotes vector or matrix transpose.    8 
relation between revenues and actions.  If, for all possible a, ππππ
2(a) = Qππππ
1(a), where Q is a 
constant stochastic transformation matrix (i.e., a matrix with non-negative elements in which 
each column sums to one and at least one column has two positive elements), then returns are a 
more (Blackwell) informative signal of the action under structure 1 than under structure 2.  One 
can think of Q as "garbling" the signal that would have obtained in the first agency problem. 
Grossman and Hart [1983, Proposition 13] show how the incentive-insurance trade-off in 
the design of the agent’s compensation scheme is affected by an improvement in information in 
the Blackwell sense.  They establish that, if there exists a stochastic transformation matrix Q 
such that ππππ
2(a) = Qππππ
1(a) for all actions a, then the principal's expected cost of implementing a 
given action in the first agency problem is no greater than the expected cost of implementing that 
action in the second agency problem. 
While distinct concepts, Blackwell informativeness and riskiness are closely related, and 
this relationship can make it difficult to determine which property drives agency costs.  We want 
to examine the risk properties of diversification, and thus want to hold the mean level of returns 
constant to facilitate comparison.  Hence, we examine informativeness in settings in which one 
returns structure is more informative than another but the expected revenues depend only on the 
action taken and not on the returns structure.  This leads us to restrict attention to mean-
preserving garblings:  stochastic transformation matrices, Q, such that Q′ x = x.  Hence, if ππππ
2(a) 
= Qππππ
1(a) for all a∈ A, then ππππ
2(a)′ x = ππππ
1(a)′ x for all a∈ A.
13  Economically, one can interpret a 
mean-preserving garbling as follows.  Under returns structure ΠΠΠΠ
1, the payoff if the nth state 
                                                 
    13   If ΠΠΠΠ
1 has less than full rank, then there may exist stochastic transformation matrices such that 
ππππ
2(a) = Qππππ
1(a) for all a ∈  A and ππππ
2(a)′ x = ππππ
1(a)′ x for all a ∈  A, but Q′ x ≠  x.  That is, Q′ x = x is a 
necessary condition only if ΠΠΠΠ
1 has full rank.  Because little use can be made (by us) of the 
additional flexibility that arises if ΠΠΠΠ
1 has less than full rank, we have chosen not to divide the 
analysis according to the rank of ΠΠΠΠ
1.    9 
occurs is xn.  Under returns structure ΠΠΠΠ
2, a lottery over revenues is held if the nth state occurs, 
where the lottery's probabilities are given by the nth column of Q, q• n. Each of these lotteries is 
mean-preserving (i.e., the nth lottery has mean xn for all n) since q• n′ x = xn by construction. 
It is no surprise that, when ππππ
2(a) = Qππππ
1(a) for all a∈ A and Q is a mean-preserving 
garbling, the densities in ΠΠΠΠ
1 are less risky than the densities in ΠΠΠΠ
2 in the sense of second-degree 
stochastic dominance—by construction ππππ
2(a) is a mean-preserving spread of ππππ
1(a). 
Proposition 1:  Consider two returns structures, ΠΠΠΠ
1 and ΠΠΠΠ
2, for which the stochastic 
transformation matrix between the first and second returns structures is a mean-preserving 
garbling.  Then: 
 i)  ΠΠΠΠ
1 is more informative than ΠΠΠΠ
2. 
 ii) For  all a ∈  A, ππππ
1(a) is less risky than ππππ
2(a) in the sense of second-degree 
stochastic dominance. 
Proposition 1(ii) is a straightforward corollary of the following theorem of Blackwell:
14 
Theorem (Blackwell):  Consider two densities, ππππ
1 and ππππ
2, with support x.  The first density is 
less risky than the second, in the sense of second-degree stochastic dominance, if and only if 
there exists a mean-preserving garbling, Q, such that ππππ
2 = Qππππ
1. 
  One might suspect that the converse of Proposition 1 is also a corollary of this Theorem.  
It is not.  The theorem holds for a pair of densities and not a pair of returns structures.  Although 
the Theorem does not imply the converse of Proposition 1, it does imply the following:
15 
                                                 
14   Marshall and Olkin [1979, p.417]. 
15   Proofs not in the text may be found in the Appendix.    10 
Proposition 2:  Let ΠΠΠΠ
1 and ΠΠΠΠ
2 be two returns structures, where: (i) ΠΠΠΠ
2 is of full rank; (ii) the 
expected returns conditional on the action taken are the same under the two returns structures; 
and (iii) for some action ã ∈ A, ππππ
1(ã) is strictly less risky than ππππ
2(ã) in the sense of second-degree 
stochastic dominance.  Then ΠΠΠΠ
2 is not more informative than ΠΠΠΠ
1 in the Blackwell sense. 
While the first two results make distinctions between informativeness and riskiness 
difficult, the following observation helps distinguish between the two concepts: 
Remark:   Let ΠΠΠΠ
1 and ΠΠΠΠ
2 be two returns structures, where: (i) ΠΠΠΠ
2 is of full rank and (ii) the 
expected returns conditional on the action taken are the same under the two returns structures.  
ΠΠΠΠ
1 and ΠΠΠΠ
2 are equally informative in the Blackwell sense if and only if there exists a permutation 
matrix M, such that ππππ
2(a) = Mππππ
1(a) for all actions a. 
This remark strongly suggests that riskiness is irrelevant: When two returns structures are 
equally informative, the cost of implementing any given action is the same under both structures, 
yet the riskiness of the two returns structures could be vastly different. 
C.  Intuitive Informativeness and Risk in Agency Settings 
Like Gjesdal [1981] and Kim [1995], we believe that Blackwell’s definition of 
informativeness is unduly restrictive for agency purposes and thus often fails to provide a ranking 
in situations in which one information structure is in fact superior to the other.  Very loosely 
speaking, the principal cares only about whether he can distinguish between the agent’s taking a 
single desired action and all other actions, and Blackwell informativeness does not make use of 
this fact. 
It is well known that, if the support of the returns varies with the agent's action in the 
right way, then the principal can completely solve the incentive problem while providing full    11 
insurance to an agent who takes the action desired by the principal.
16  The following example 
exploits this fact to show that the principal may well prefer a returns structure that gives rise to a 
high level of risk (and information) to one that does not. 
Example 1:  Suppose x = (1,2,3)′ ; A = {0,1}; and  






























































































1 ) 1 ( and 0 ) 1 ( , ) 0 ( ) 0 ( π π π π  
It is straightforward to verify that, for both a, ππππ
2(a) is less risky than ππππ
1(a).
17   Under returns 
structure 2, the cost of implementing a = 1 exceeds the full-information level because the optimal 
contract that induces the agent to take this action entails her bearing some of the risk.  Under 
returns structure 1, however, obtaining a revenue of 2 is proof that the manager took action a = 0, 
and the owner can thus implement a = 1 at the full-information cost.  Therefore, the owner 
prefers the riskier returns structure 1.  
  Example 1 illustrates the fact that Blackwell informativeness is an imperfect measure of 
informativeness in an agency problem—while the two returns structures could not be ranked 
according to the Blackwell criterion, the second structure clearly is more informative in an 
intuitive sense.  Our next result shows that this point is not dependent on the existence of a 
shifting support. 
  This result builds on the following notion of informativeness.  Suppose that the principal 
                                                 
16   For a subtle and elegant generalization of the so-called “shifting support” result, see Mirrlees 
[1999]. 
17    Note that there is no common stochastic transformation matrix such that ππππ
1(a) = Qππππ
2(a).  Because 
π 2
1 ( 1) = 0, the middle row of Q would necessarily consist entirely of zeros, which would be 
inconsistent with π 2
1(0) = 1/3.  Thus, the returns structures cannot be ranked by the criterion of 
Blackwell informativeness.    12 
wants to induce the agent to choose action â.  Intuitively, the principal's ability to discern whether 
the agent has indeed chosen this action will depend on how dissimilar are the densities over 
profits associated with other actions.  Thus, we will interpret returns structure 1 as being more 




2(a) is from ππππ
2(â). 
Proposition 3:  If two returns structures, ΠΠΠΠ
1 and ΠΠΠΠ
2, are such that: 
 (i)  for  each  n ∈  N either 
  ππππ nnnn aaaa aa
11 22 0 () ( )( )( )\ { } −>−≥ ∀ ∈ A  
or 
  ππππ nnnn aaaa aa
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and 




























then the cost of implementing â under returns structure ΠΠΠΠ
1 is less than or equal to the cost under 
ΠΠΠΠ
2.  If â is not a least-cost action (i.e., if K(â) > K(a) for some a ∈ A), then the inequality is strict.  
  It is well known within agency theory that what is important for solving an agency 
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i(a)=are positive constants.  Proposition 3’s two conditions are conditions on the    13 
way the h
i
n(a,â) are distributed under the two information systems.  As such, Proposition 3 is 
related to Kim’s [1995] work, which shows that, if the distribution of the likelihood ratios under 
information structure 1 is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution under information 
structure 2, then 1 is more informative (leads to a better solution of the agency problem) than 2.  
Our conditions, although closely related to Kim’s, are different.  It is possible to show by 
example that information structures can satisfy our conditions without their likelihood ratios 
being ordered by second-degree stochastic dominance as required by Kim.
18 
  The important point to note is that π
1(â) and π
2(â) may satisfy our conditions even though 
π
1(â) is riskier than π
2(â), as Example 1 above illustrates.  This point can be seen more generally 
by comparing these two conditions with the definition of second-degree stochastic dominance, 
inequality (1) above.  The following example further illustrates this point. 
Example 2:  Suppose that x = (0, 100, 200)′ ,  
  ππππ
1(a1) = ππππ
2(a1) = (.395, .48, .125)′ , 
  ππππ
1(a2) = ππππ
2(a2) = (.32, .48, .2)′ , 
  ππππ
1(a3) = (.48, .04, .48)′ , 
and 
  ππππ
2(a3) = (.46, .08, .46)′ . 
Moreover, suppose that 3K(a1) = 2K(a2) = K(a3) = θ  > 0. 
  The expected returns conditional on actions a1, a2, and a3 are 73, 88, and 100, 
respectively.  Thus, for θ  sufficiently low, the principal will choose a contract that induces the 
agent to take action a3.  By Proposition 3, it costs less to implement a3 under the first information 
                                                 
18   An example can be constructed when there are two states and two actions, a and â, such that 
π 1
1(a) = .7, π 1
1(â) = .3, π 1
2(a) = .7, and π 1
2(â) = .35.  Details available upon request.  Stochastic 
dominance is not a necessary condition because, although the principal’s costs are convex in (2), 
the weights µ
i=and λ
i(a) also depend on the information.    14 
structure than under the second one.  But ππππ
1(a3) is a mean-preserving spread of ππππ
2(a3)—the 
principal chooses the riskier returns structure. 
  We gain additional insight into Proposition 3 by holding the probability density 
associated with â invariant across the returns structures being compared while varying the 
densities associated with other actions.  By doing this, riskiness is held constant across the two 
returns structures but informativeness may vary.  The following corollary establishes that given 
the choice between two returns structures with equal riskiness, the principal chooses the one that 
is more informative as measured by the distance between densities. 
Corollary:  If two returns structures, ΠΠΠΠ
1 and ΠΠΠΠ
2, are such that 
 i)  ππππ
1(â) = ππππ
2(â) ≡    π  , 
and 
 ii)  for  each  n ∈  N either  () () πππ nnn
12 aa  >≥ ∀ a ∈  A\{â} or  () () πππ nnn
12 aa  <≤ 
∀ a ∈  A\{â}, 
then the cost of implementing â is less under returns structure ΠΠΠΠ
1 than under ΠΠΠΠ
2.
 19 
  The corollary underscores again that when risk and informativeness are not related, 
informativeness matters and risk does not. 
3. RISK AND INFORMATION EFFECTS OF DIVERSIFICATION AND HEDGING 
A. Diversification 
Having looked at returns structures in the abstract, we now ask how they relate to 
diversification.  We do so in the context of a simple illustrative example.   There are one or two 
projects, depending on the case under consideration.  The agent chooses whether to apply 0, 1, or 
                                                 
19   The corollary also follows from Kim’s [1995] main proposition suitably modified for a discrete state space.    15 
2 units of effort to each available project.  A project succeeds with probability γα , where γ  ∈  
(0,½) and α  is the effort allocated to that project; otherwise it fails.  The projects’ successes are 
statistically independent.  The agent’s cost of effort depends solely on the total effort, a, not the 
allocation between projects.  K(a) is finite if a ∈  {0,1,2} and is infinite otherwise.  The owner’s 
gross benefit is xS  > 0 from a project that succeeds.  We normalize the payoff of failure as 0.  If 
two projects succeed, the owner’s gross benefit is 2xS.  Notice that the expected gross benefit for 
a given level of total effort, γ axS, is independent of how that effort is allocated across projects.  
Because our focus is on the informational and risk impacts of diversification in a hidden-action 
problem, we want the expected revenue (conditional on a given level of total effort) to be 
invariant with respect to the extent of diversification.
20 
  Because the projects are ex ante identical and independent, there is no loss in generality 
from assuming that if the manager conducts only one project, she conducts the first. When both 
projects are available, the manager chooses actions from the set {(0,0), (1,0), (2,0), (1,1)} ≡  A2, 
where a pair represents effort allocated to the first and second project, respectively. Observe that 
the manager’s choice set when only one project is available, A1, is equivalent to the subset 
consisting of the first three elements of A2. 
 Because  A1 and A2 are of different sizes, the resulting information structures cannot be 
directly compared using Blackwell informativeness or the methods of Proposition 3.  However, 
the problem can be analyzed by other means. 
Lemma 1: Suppose K(⋅ ) is affine (or concave) on {0,1,2}.   The cost of inducing (2,0) when the 
                                                 
20    We are not allowing the firm to expand by simply adding more projects of equal size.  As Samuelson [1963] 
(cited in Diamond [1984]) showed, adding statistically independent projects in this manner might not reduce 
the manager's aversion to the risk of any one project.  Moreover, managers might be unable to control a larger 
number of projects if they had to undertake them all without either hiring additional managers or taking on joint 
venture partners.    16 
agent’s action set is A1 is equal to the cost of inducing (2,0) when the action set is { (0,0), (2,0)}.  
Proof: Let v ≡  (v0,v1) ≡  [V(y0),V(y1)] denote a contract stated in terms of the agent’s utility. Then 
the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint for the agent to choose (2,0) instead of (0,0) is 
2γ v1 + (1-2γ )v0 – K(2) ≥  v0 – K(0), 
which is equivalent to 
                                                          γ (v1 – v0) ≥   [K(2) – K(0)]/2.    (3)   
Using the fact that [K(2) – K(0)]/2 ≥  K(2) – K(1), inequality (3) implies 
2γ v1 + (1-2γ )v0 – K(2) ≥  γ v1 + (1-γ )v0– K(1) , 
which is the IC constraint for the choice of (2,0) instead of (1,1).  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 4:  Suppose K(⋅ ) is affine (or concave) on {0,1,2}.   The cost of implementing a = 2 
is independent of whether diversification is feasible.   
Proof:  Suppose the choice sets are {(0,0), (2,0)} and {(0,0), (1,1)}.  The following stochastic 
















Because adding new possible actions cannot reduce the principal’s cost of inducing an existing 
action, it follows that the cost of inducing a = 2 under A2 is no less than the minimum of the cost 
when the choice set is {(0,0), (1,1)} and the cost when the choice set is {(0,0), (2,0)}. By the first 
part of this proof, this minimum is no less than the cost when the choice set is {(0,0), (2,0)}.  
Thus, by Lemma 1, the cost of inducing a = 2 under A2 is no less than the cost under A1.  On the 
other hand, because there is a shifting support when the agent chooses (1,1)—this is the only way    17 
she could get two successes—the principal can costlessly force the agent not to take (1,1).  
Therefore, the cost of inducing (2,0) under A2 equals the cost of inducing it under A1. Q.E.D. 
  We have shown that there is no advantage to making diversification feasible, but—
because the principal can costlessly block it—there is no disadvantage either.  It is nonetheless 
informative to consider the contrived case where the principal must choose between 
diversification and non-diversification; that is between the action sets Ad ≡  {(0,0),(1,0),(1,1)} and 
A1, respectively. When K(·) is affine or concave, the existence of the non-trivial garbling that 
maps {(0,0), (2,0)} into {(0,0), (1,1)} implies that the principal would be strictly worse off given 
the latter two-element action set than the former because the agent is strictly risk averse and a = 2 
is not a least-cost action for the agent.  As Lemma 1 showed, the cost of implementing a = 2 
given the former two-element action set is the same as the cost under the larger set A1.  Because 
adding undesired actions cannot reduce the principal’s cost, the cost of implementing a = 2 in the 
latter two-element action set is no greater than under the larger set Ad.  By transitivity, 
implementing a = 2 without diversification (i.e., implementing (2,0) under A1) costs strictly less 
than implementing a = 2 with diversification (i.e., implementing (1,1) under Ad). 
 Now  suppose  K convex.  An argument similar to that used to prove Lemma 1 establishes: 
Lemma 2: Suppose K(⋅ ) is convex on {0,1,2}.   The cost of inducing (2,0) when the agent’s 
action set is A1 is equal to the cost of inducing (2,0) when the action set is { (1,0), (2,0)}.  
  We can show by example that it can be cheaper to induce a = 2 when the choice set is 
{(1,0), (2,0)} than when it’s {(1,0), (1,1)}.
 21  By Lemma 2, the cost under A1 is equal to the cost 
under the first action set.  Because adding undesired actions cannot reduce the principal’s cost of 
                                                 
21   By numerical simulation, it can be shown that when V(y) = ln(y), γ  ∈  (1/20,9/20), K(0) = 0, K(2) 
= 2, and K(1) = θ , θ  ∈  (1/10,9/10), then it’s cheaper to induce a = 2 in the first case than it is in    18 
inducing an existing desired action, the cost of inducing (1,1) under Ad is no less than the cost 
when the choice set is {(1,0), (1,1)}. Therefore, this example demonstrates that it can be strictly 
cheaper to induce a = 2 without diversification (i.e., under A1) than by diversifying (i.e., under 
Ad) regardless of whether K(·) is affine, concave, or convex. 
  In the situations identified above, conditional on a = 2, diversification is actually riskier 
than focusing on a single project.
22  Moreover, diversification reduces informativeness.  By 
splitting effort, the probability of being successful falls for any given for a given project. And 
success serves as a signal of high effort.  Thus, although now there are two projects to observe, 
the cumulative effects of the decrease in the informativeness of each project outweighs the 
information gained by having two projects. 
  This conclusion may appear at odds with Aron’s [1988] findings. Her article appears to 
show that diversification helps ameliorate the incentive problem. The difference lies in our 
assumptions about whether diversifying lessens the impact of the agent’s action on a given 
project or not. We assume that the cost of diversification is that it reduces the probability that any 
given project will succeed; that is, by splitting a given level of total effort among multiple 
projects, the probability that any one project succeeds will fall.  In contrast, Aron essentially 
assumes that the probability of success is not diminished, but the reward associated with success 
is.
23 
  When diversification leaves the probability of success unaffected and simply lowers the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the second. 
22   It is readily shown that this result is not the consequence of having assumed independence 
between the projects.   
23   In our setting, this approach would correspond to having the probability of success of each 
project be is γ a, where a is the agent’s total effort.  The payoffs from a project’s success would 
be xS/2 if two projects are chosen and xS if only one project is undertaken.    19 
payoff from success, diversification increases informativeness. This is not surprising: The sample 
size doubles without any degradation of the signal. On the other hand, this type of diversification 
strikes us as more likely to be the exception than the rule. In many situations, we would expect 
that division of effort among multiple projects (e.g., different R&D directions) would reduce the 
probability that any given project would succeed.  In that case, diversification can decrease 
informativeness.  When diversification changes the quality of the performance signals, the impact 
of diversification on informativeness—and thus the impact on the principal’s equilibrium 
payoffs—is ambiguous. 
B.   Hedging 
  Many corporations use financial instruments, such as insurance and foreign exchange 
futures contracts to hedge risk.  As with corporate diversification, economists have pointed to 
agency as an explanation of why firms with risk neutral owners would engage in such behavior.
24 
Let pi(ωωωω ) denote the return from holding one unit of hedging security i when the state is ωωωω , and let 
p(ωωωω ) denote the corresponding vector of payoffs for all hedging securities.  ωωωω  comprises the 
verifiable variables on which the payoffs of the financial contracts depend, and p(⋅ ) maps these 
variables into payoffs.  Let m denote the firm’s holdings of hedging securities.  Then, the firm’s 
payoff is z = x + m′ p(ωωωω ), where as before x is the firm’s revenue. Note that if the elements of 
p(ωωωω ) are independent of the agent’s action, a, then there can be no benefit to contracting on z 
instead of x—x is a sufficient statistic for a .
25  Indeed, if p(ωωωω ) is noisy, then z is less informative 
than x and the firm’s owner is worse off contracting on z instead of x 
  There is no need to take non-zero positions in these securities even when the distribution 
                                                 
24   For analyses of incentives to reduce risk through financial contracts, see Smith and Stulz [1985] 
and DeMarzo and Duffie [1995].    20 
of p(ωωωω ) depends on a, and thus the realization of p(ωωωω ) might serve as an informative signal of the 
agent’s action.  Because ωωωω  is verifiable, the owner can condition the agent’s compensation on z 
without purchasing any securities. In fact, because there is little reason to expect that the optimal 
contract would be a function of the sum of x and m′′′ ′ p(ωωωω ),contracting on z is very likely worse 
than contracting directly on x and ωωωω .  Thus, in our model, if he has the information needed to do 
so, the owner should forbid the purchase of any hedging securities that offer negative expected 
returns (e.g., insurance contracts).  If, however, the agent has better information about the 
expected returns, then it may be inefficient for the owner to control m directly.  In such settings, 
hedging could be a factor in agency problems. We explore issues of who controls the information 
structure in the next section. 
4.  WHO CONTROLS THE INFORMATION STRUCTURE? 
  So far, we have assumed that the owner decides whether the firm should diversify or not. 
 In many situations, this is a reasonable assumption:  A merger or acquisition often requires 
shareholder approval, for example, and is of sufficient importance that it can pay owners to 
become informed about the transaction.  On the other hand, there are diversification decisions 
(e.g., the number of paths to pursue in developing a new product) that managers make with little 
direct oversight.  For there to be a meaningfully distinction between situations in which the 
principal chooses the information structure and those in which the agent chooses, the principal 
must not be able to make the agent’s compensation contingent on the choice of information 
structure in the latter case.  While this inability may be implausible when the choice entails new 
lines of business, it is much more likely when the choice is with regard to the number of R&D or 
marketing projects to pursue. 
                                                                                                                                                             
25   See Holmstrom [1979].    21 
  We can embed the choice of returns structure in a standard agency problem in which the 
agent chooses an action pair consisting of a productive action, a, and an “information-structure” 
action, i.  We call the principal-agent problem in which the owner can specify the returns 
structure in the contract (i.e., the diversification choice is verifiable) the direct-choice problem.  
We call the principal-agent problem in which the agency contract depends solely on the firm's 
realized returns the indirect-choice problem because the owner indirectly chooses the returns 
structure through the incentive scheme they offer to his manager.
26 
Obviously, the owner’s expected profit in the indirect-choice problem is no greater than 
his expected profit in the direct-choice problem.  The first question we ask is:  When is his 
expected profit no less?  Because of the congruence of Blackwell informativeness and riskiness, 
we know that the manager will choose the more informative returns structure if there is a mean-
preserving garbling between the two returns structures and the manager is risk averse with 
respect to the firm's profits (i.e., the composition of the agent's compensation scheme and her 
utility function is concave).  Recall vi ≡  V(yi), where yi is the agent's monetary compensation 
contingent on the firm's returns being xi.  
Corollary to Proposition 1:  Consider two returns structures, ΠΠΠΠ
1 and ΠΠΠΠ
2, such that the second 
returns structure is a mean-preserving garbling of the first, and suppose that the composition of 
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26    The indirect-choice model is an example of a multi-task principal-agent model.  For more on multi-task 
principal-agent problems see Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991].    22 
Then the manager prefers the first returns structure to the second. 
 
For each action, the density in ΠΠΠΠ
2 is a riskier distribution over revenues than the corresponding 
density in ΠΠΠΠ
1.  It follows that, for any action she might choose, the manager expects to do better 
under the first returns structure than the second. 
  Condition (4) is unsatisfactory, in that it is an assumption about endogenous variables.  
The next proposition builds on an earlier result of Grossman and Hart [1983] to state its 
assumptions in terms of exogenous conditions. 
Proposition 5:  Consider two returns structures, ΠΠΠΠ
1 and ΠΠΠΠ
2, where the second is a mean-
preserving garbling of the first.  Suppose that the following conditions are satisfied: 
 A1  (No Shifting Support):  () π n
i a > 0 for all a ∈  A, n ∈  N, and i ∈  {1,2}. 
 A2  (Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property):  For all a and â  in A, K(a) < K(â) implies 
that  () () ππ n
i
n
i a/  a  is non-increasing and convex in n and i ∈  {1,2}. 
 A3  (Concavity of Distribution Function Property):  K(a) = γ K(â) + (1-γ )K(ã) (γ  ∈  
[0,1]) implies P
i(a) ≤  γ P
i(â) + (1-γ )P
i(ã), where P
i(a) is the cumulative distribution 
function vector over revenues induced by action a (i.e., P
i(a) = 
() () () () () () ππ π π π 11 2 1
ii i i
N
i a, a a, , a a ++ +
′
 ), i ∈  {1,2}. 
 A4  (Income Effects on Attitudes toward Risk):  1/V′ (y) is concave in y. 
 A5  (Convex Revenues):  xn - xn-1 is non-decreasing in n. 
Then the optimal contract for the direct-choice problem is also an optimal contract for the 
indirect-choice problem.  Moreover, this contract induces the manager to choose the more 
informative returns structure and yields the owner an expected profit equal to what he would 
receive in the direct-choice problem.    23 
  Assumptions 2-5 strike us as restrictive, and there exist plausible settings in which the 
optimal contract entails the manager's utility being a non-concave function of returns.  In such 
cases, the manager prefers the less informative returns structure and the owner’s expected profit 
is strictly less in the indirect-choice problem.  It is useful to explore why.  In particular, profits 
could be lower because fewer actions are implementable in the indirect-choice problem or 
because those actions that are implementable cost more to implement. 
  We first compare the set of implementable actions in the two problems.  To this end, we 
define the following property. 
 
Definition (Convexity of Disutility Property):  Action a satisfies convexity of disutility if 
ππππ (a)′ x =  j∈ J λ jππππ (aj)′ x implies that K(a) ≤   j∈ J λ jK(aj), where {λ j} is a set of non-negative 
weights summing to one and J is an index set for actions other than a.
27 
 
This property implies that any mixed strategy over actions that yields the same expected revenue 
as action a must yield the manager a greater expected disutility of effort than a. 
Proposition 6:  Consider two returns structures, ΠΠΠΠ
1 and ΠΠΠΠ
2, where the second is a mean-
preserving garbling of the first.  Suppose that action â satisfies the convexity of disutility 
property in the direct-choice problem (i.e., under the first returns structure).  Then there exists a 
contract in the indirect-choice problem that implements â and induces the manager to choose the 
more informative returns structure. 
The convexity of disutility property is a more stringent property than implementability in the 
                                                 
    
27    This property is related to the Concavity of Distribution Function Property above.  It differs in that it applies to 
any convex combination of actions and is based on expected values rather than first-degree stochastic 
dominance.    24 
direct-choice problem.
28 
  Of course being able to implement an action pair does not imply that the owner would 
want to implement it.  Indeed, it is possible in the indirect-choice problem that the owner would 
prefer to implement the less informative returns structure.  We illustrate this with an example. 
Example 3:  Suppose V(y) = ln(y), A = {0,1}, K(0) = 0, K(1) = 1, ππππ
1(0) = (.5,.25,.25)′ , ππππ
1(1) = 
(.4,.05,.55)′ , and x = (0,12,24)′ .  Intuitively, this example represents the following situation.  By 
working hard (a = 1), the manager does not greatly reduce the chance that the project will be a 
complete failure (x = 0).  But the manager's effort does affect whether a successful project will do 
all right or extremely well.  Now, consider returns structure ΠΠΠΠ
2 = QΠΠΠΠ
















Under either information structure, the optimal contract for implementing a = 0 is to pay the 
agent y = 1 for all outcomes.  The owner’s expected profit is 8.  The optimal contract for 
implementing (a=1, i=1) is  ~ ., ~ ., ~ . yy y 12 3 15 187 2276 ≈≈ ≈ and  , with an expected cost of 12.67.  
The optimal contract for implementing (a=1, i=2) is y1 ≈  3.09, y2 ≈  .02, and y3 ≈  3.75.  This 
contract's expected cost is 3.32, and the owner’s expected profit is 10.48.  Therefore, the owner 
will induce the agent to choose the less informative information structure, i=2. 
 
  Under either returns structure, the optimal contract for implementing a = 1 is one that 
punishes the manager for achieving x = 12 (since x = 12 is a relatively rare event if a = 1, but a 
                                                 
    
28   Implementability of a in the direct-choice problem requires only that there exists some vector v such that, if 
ππππ (a)′ v = Σ j∈ J λ jππππ (aj)′ v, then K(a) ≤  Σ j∈ J λ jK(aj), where {λ j} is a set of non-negative weights summing to one.    25 
relatively more common event if a = 0).  Consequently, the manager's utility is a convex function 
of revenue, so she prefers the riskier—and therefore less informative—returns structure. 
  In this example, because the two returns structures are very “close” to one another and 
there is relatively little loss of information.  Would the owner implement the less informative 
returns structure if the two returns structures were "far apart"?  The following proposition shows 
the answer is no when one interprets the notion of “far apart” as the repeated application of a 
mean-preserving garbling: 
Proposition 7:  Consider returns structure ΠΠΠΠ
1 and mean-preserving garbling Q.  Suppose that 
(Q)
n converges to Q
∞  as n goes to ∞ .  In the indirect-choice problem with returns structures ΠΠΠΠ
1 
and ΠΠΠΠ
2 ≡  Q
∞ ΠΠΠΠ
1, the owner will choose a contract that induces the agent to choose the more 
informative returns structure, ΠΠΠΠ
1. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
  We explored agency as a possible explanation for why corporations diversify even when 
their shareholders could otherwise do so on their own.  In evaluating alternative forms of 
organizing the firm and the agent’s activities, owners of the firm potentially care about the 
returns’ mean, riskiness, and informativeness. 
We first examined the relationship between riskiness and informativeness.  We showed 
that diversification that improves the informativeness of the returns structure in the Blackwell 
sense also reduces the firm's riskiness (Proposition 1).  Thus, even if risk-neutral owners did not 
desire a reduction in risk per se, one might observe a positive correlation between diversification 
and risk reduction.  To explore this issue further, we proposed alternative measures of 
informativeness appropriate for agency relationships.  Using these measures, we showed 
(Example 1 and Proposition 3) that owners may choose returns structures (e.g., diversification    26 
strategies) that are more informative but entail increased risk. 
We next turned to examination of the effects of diversification on informativeness and 
riskiness.  In the context of an extended example, we showed that diversification that entails the 
spreading of managerial effort—rather than purely financial diversification—has ambiguous 
effects on risk and information. 
Lastly, we considered situations in which the manager controls the diversification 
decision.  We derived conditions under which the manager would choose to adopt the owners' 
preferred diversification strategy.  Consequently, leaving the diversification decision to the 
manager under these conditions would be without cost to the owners.  More generally, delegating 
the diversification decision to the manager can be costly for the owners.  This is not so much 
because delegation makes it impossible to implement certain courses of action—the condition 
under which it has no impact on the set of implementable actions is relatively innocuous—but 
rather because of the loss of information.  It is ambiguous whether the manager will, in 
equilibrium, choose the same diversification strategy as would the owners had they controlled the 
diversification decision.  In Example 3, we showed that choices could be different; but, in 
Propositions 5 and 7, we derived conditions under which the choices would be the same. 
In closing, we want to discuss the claim that diversification generates financial benefits 
by economizing on bankruptcy costs.
29  Without getting into a full analysis of bankruptcy here, 
we want to raise several issues.  First, it is not obvious that diversification economizes on 
bankruptcy costs.  In general, combining projects can raise or lower the expected costs of 
bankruptcy because a single failing project may be "saved" by other (successful) projects, or it 
                                                 
    
29   For an early example of a model in which this occurs, see Lewellen [1971].    27 
may drag all of them down.
30  Second, it is critical to understand why firms issue securities that 
give rise to the possibility of bankruptcy.  If bankruptcy serves a useful role, then diversification 
to avoid bankruptcy may be costly.  For example, if bankruptcy is a device to discipline managers 
(e.g., the manager gets in trouble only when there is a bankruptcy), then a joint venture or some 
other form of diversification may allow a manager to undertake projects that investors would 
otherwise reject.
31  Finally, one does not want to overstate the costs of bankruptcy.  A firm with 
value as an ongoing concern may renegotiate its debts without formally going bankrupt or may 
reorganize (and continue to operate) under bankruptcy.  In either case, the costs are largely 
administrative ones, not the loss in the value of firm's productive activities. 
                                                 
    
30   For more on this point, see Higgins' [1971] discussion of Lewellen [1971]. 
    
31   Several authors have sought to model these issues formally.  See, for example, Aghion and Bolton [1992], 
Harris and Raviv [1990], and Hart [1991].    28 
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APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 2:  Suppose, contrary to the statement of the proposition, that ΠΠΠΠ
2 is more 
Blackwell informative.  Then there exists a stochastic transformation matrix R such that ΠΠΠΠ
1 = 
RΠΠΠΠ
2.  Since the two returns structures yield the same expected returns conditional on the same 
action, ΠΠΠΠ
2′ (R - I)′ x = 0.  Because ΠΠΠΠ
2 has full rank, it follows that R′ x = x.  Thus, R is a mean-
preserving garbling.  From Blackwell's Theorem, it follows that ππππ
2(a) is less risky than ππππ
1(a)—
but this contradicts the assumption that ππππ
1(a) is strictly less risky than ππππ
2(a).  Q.E.D. 
  In the proofs below, we will make use of the following two facts about the individual 
rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints stated below.  One, if contract v 
satisfies these constraints, then it implements action â.  Two, if the optimal solution to the agency 
problem entails implementing action â, then it must satisfy these constraints. 
  i∈ N π i(â)vi = K(â) (IR) 
and  
  i∈ N {π i(a)-π i(â)}vi  ≤   K(a) - K(â)  ∀ a ∈ A.
32 (IC) 
Lemma A1:  If v* is the solution to an agency problem in which π m(a)-π m(â) > 0 > π n(a)-π n(â) 
∀ a ∈ A\{â}, then vm* ≤  vn*. 
Proof of Lemma A1:  Suppose that, contrary to the hypothesis of the lemma, 
π m(a)-π m(â) > 0 > π n(a)-π n(â) ∀ a ∈ A\{â} and vm* > vn*.   
 Define  v
a by 
                                                 
    
32    When the agent's utility is additively separable—as it is here—there is no loss in generality from assuming that 

































Since π n(â) cannot be zero, v0 is well defined.  It is trivial to verify that v
a satisfies the (IR) 
constraint. 
  Turning to the (IC) constraints, we have 
  i∈ N {π i(a)-π i(â)}vi
a  =  i∈ N {π i(a)-π i(â)}vi* + {v0-vm*}{π m(a)-π m(â)} + {v0-vn*}{π n(a)-π n(â)} 
         <    i∈ N {π i(a)-π i(â)}vi*  ≤  K(a) - K(â)  ∀ a ∈  A. 
Thus, the contract v
a implements â.  Since the agent's expected utility is the same, but the 
contract entails less variability, Jensen's inequality implies that the principal prefers v
a to v*, 
which contradicts the optimality of v*.      Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3:  Condition (ii) implies  () π n a
2 0  >  for all n.  Thus, if â can be 
implemented at first-best cost under the second returns structure, it follows from Proposition 3 of 
Grossman and Hart [1983] that it must be a least-cost action.  But if â is a least-cost action, it can 
be implemented at first-best cost under either information structure.  This completes the proof if 
â is a least-cost action.  It also shows that if â is not a least-cost action, then it cannot be 
implemented at first-best cost (i.e., under a full-insurance contract). 
  Assume, henceforth, that â is not a least-cost action.  Suppose that v* is an optimal 
contract when the returns structure is ΠΠΠΠ

































Such a β  exists by hypothesis.  Define R ≡  β I + [π
2(â)] - β [π
1(â)], where [π ] is the N ×  N matrix    33 
in which each column is π .  Combining the result that  () π n a
2 0  >  for all n with the definition of β , 
it follows that every element of R is positive.  Define ~ '* vR v ≡ , so that 
  () () () ~  .








Define  () () {} S ≡− > ia a ii |  ππ
11 0 .  Lastly, define v0 ≡  maxi∈∈∈∈ S vi*.  Note that, by Lemma A1, 
v0 ≤  mini∈ N\S vi*. 
  It is trivial to verify that ~ v  satisfies the (IR) constraint when the information structure is 
ΠΠΠΠ
1.  Now, consider the (IC) constraints.  Using the fact that  i∈ N {π i(a)-π i(â)} = 0, we have 
() () () () () ()
() () () ( ) () () () ( )
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by condition (i) of the Proposition, the construction of β , and the definition of v0.  Simplifying, 
() () () () () ()
() ()




aa v aa v
Ka Ka a









where the last inequality follows from the fact that v* is a solution to the agency problem under 
returns structure ΠΠΠΠ
2.  Hence, the (IC) constraints are satisfied by ~ v  under returns structure ΠΠΠΠ
1. 
  It remains to show that the principal prefers contract under returns structure ΠΠΠΠ
1 to 
contract v* under returns structure ΠΠΠΠ
2.  Define y ≡  (y1, …, yN)′ , where yn = V
 -1(vn) (adding 
asterisks or tildes as appropriate).  By construction  ~ '* vnn = • rv, where r• n is the nth column of 
R.  Because (i) V
 -1(·) is a strictly convex function, (ii) y* is not a full-insurance contract, and (iii)    34 
r• n has no zero element, Jensen's inequality implies that  ~ '* ynn < • ry  for all n.  Hence, 
() () () () () πππ π











where the final equality follows from the fact that Rππππ
1(a) = ππππ
2(a).  Therefore, the expected 
monetary compensation under the first information structure is strictly less than the expected 
monetary compensation under the second information structure.     Q.E.D. 
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 3: Assumptions (i) and (ii) of the corollary imply that 
conditions (i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 are satisfied, since ππππ
1(â) = ππππ
2(â) ≡    π  implies that 
minn∈ N ππ nn aa
21 1 ()/ () = .      Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5:  Proposition 9 of Grossman and Hart [1983] establishes that, under 
Assumptions A1-A4, the optimal contract, yn+1 - yn, is non-increasing in n.  Since V(•) is concave, 
it follows that vn+1 - vn is also non-increasing in n.  This and Assumption A5 imply condition (4) 
is satisfied in the Corollary to Proposition 1.    Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6:  Suppose, contrary to the proposition, that the pair (â,1) is not 
implementable (where (a, i) denotes action a and returns structure i).  By Proposition 2 of 
Hermalin and Katz [1991], there exist sets A1 ⊆ A and A2 ⊆ A and a set of positive weights 
{µ (a),λ (a)} summing to one such that 
  () () () () () πµ πλ π
112
12













Post-multiplying (5) by x and simplifying yields    35 
  () () () πµ π
11
12































2 1  
where 1{• } is an indicator function.  By construction,  ()  µ a > 0 and the sum of  ()  µ a  over a in 
(A1 ∪ A2)\{â} is one.  Carrying out the same simplification on (6) yields 
  () () () Ka aKa
a





But (7) and (8) contradict the assumption that â satisfies the convexity of disutility property. 
  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 7:  Suppose the equilibrium contract, v*, implements (a*, i=2).  Define 
~ '* vQv ≡
∞ , and note that ππππ
1(a)′ ~ v  = ππππ
2(a)′ v*. 
  We will now show that the contract ~ v  implements (a*,i=1).  Consider first the (IR) 
constraint.  Since 
  ππππ
1(a*)′ ~ v  - K(a*) = ππππ
2(a*)′ v* - K(a*) = 0, 
the (IR) constraint is satisfied.  Next consider the (IC) constraints.  Because the choice of returns 
structure is endogenous, we have two sets of constraints 
   {π
1(a)′ -π




1(a*)′ }~ v ≤  K(a) - K(a*)  ∀ a ∈ A (10) 
Condition (9) is satisfied because    36 
  ππππ
1(a)′  ~ v = ππππ
2(a)′ v*, 
and v* implements a* under ΠΠΠΠ
2.  Consider (10).  Using the fact that Q
∞  must be an idempotent 
matrix (i.e., Q
∞ Q
∞  = Q
∞ ), we have 
  ππππ
2(a)′  ~ v  = ππππ
1(a)′ Q
∞ ′ Q
∞ ′ v* = ππππ
1(a)′ Q
∞ ′ v* = ππππ
2(a)′ v*. 
This, the fact that ππππ
1(a*)′ ~ v  = ππππ
2(a*)′ v*, and the fact that v* implements a* under ΠΠΠΠ
2, imply (10). 
  Next, we show that ~ y  has lower expected cost than y* (where, as before, yn = V
 -1(vn)).  
~ vn = q• n′ v
*, where q• n is the nth column of Q
∞ .  Since V
 -1(·) is a convex function, Jensen's 
inequality implies that ~ yn≤  q• n′ y* for all n.  This, in turn, implies that ππππ
1(a*)′ ~ y  ≤  ππππ
2(a*)′ y*.  
Thus, the expected monetary payments made by the principal to the agent are lower when a* is 
implemented under returns structure 1 rather than 2.  Since ππππ
1(a*)′ x = ππππ
2(a*)′ x, the expected 
gross returns are identical.  It follows that the owners (weakly) prefer implementing (a*,i=1) to 
implementing (a*, i=2). Q.E.D. 
  